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Abstract
This paper investigates the impact of political leaders’ migration experience on the quality of their lead-
ership. We build up an original database on the personal background of 932 politicians who were at the head
of the executive power in a developing country over the 1960-2004 period. We put forward a positive effect
of the leader having studied abroad on the level of democracy in his country during his tenure. This effect
is shown to be independent from the leader’s education level, as well as from his profession. Moreover, it
is mainly driven by countries with a poor initial level of democracy. These results are confirmed by various
robustness tests. They propose a new channel through which migration may affect politics in the sending
countries, namely the emergence of the elites.
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1 Introduction
Recent as well as ancient history of the world has been marked by some individual personalities who played an
important role either in major events (economic, political, cultural, etc.) or in the construction of ideologies
and intellectual trends, or both. This in particular the case of certain political figures, such as Joseph Stalin,
Felix Houphoue¨t-Boigny or Indira Gandhi. When reaching the highest functions, political leaders become
likely to shape the development path of their country, which may have long-run consequences.
Although they may be constrained in their actions through different national mechanisms, such as checks
and balances or strong armies, leaders of the executive power undoubtedly play a potentially major role in
the political and economic evolution of the country they are at the head of. Jones and Olken (2005) find that
individual leaders have had a crucial impact on the growth pattern and policy outcomes of their countries
since 1945. Leaders’ effects are shown to be more important in autocratic settings, where their actions are
less constrained. Thus, leaders have an individual impact on country-level economic and political outcomes.
Following this result, one associated question emerges: which individual characteristics of the leaders affect
the quality of their leadership and the development outcomes of their country? Besley, Montalvo, and Reynal-
Querol (2011) started investigating this issue by studying the impact of leaders’ education, and emphasized
a positive and significant impact of leaders’ educational attainment on growth. In this paper, we propose a
different perspective in two respects: first, we question the impact of leaders’ characteristics on democracy
in developing countries, an outcome that has never been tested by the literature to date. Second, thanks
to the original data at hand, we specifically document the impact of leaders’ migration experience on their
country’s outcome.
The first contribution of this paper is to build up a new database gathering information on the personal
characteristics of 932 leaders who were at the head of a developing country between 1960 and 2004. In
particular the data document their migration history, an information that, to our knowledge, was not available
in any existing database. Its second contribution is to provide original evidence about one specific channel
through which migration may impact politics in the home country: namely, the emergence of national elites.
Anecdotal evidence clearly shows that a lot of leaders in the developing world had a migration experience
before reaching power. It is much less clear whether these migration experiences affect the quality of their
leadership, and in which direction. Some cases suggest that leaders who lived abroad in their past are prone
to promote democracy. For instance, after having realized part of his studies in Russia, Punsalmaagiin
Ochirbat led the Mongolian 1990 Democratic Revolution. During the seven following years that he spent
in power, he accompanied his country toward the stabilization of democracy. On the contrary, history also
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provides instances of autocrats with an experience abroad. This is the case of Saddam Hussein, President
of Iraq between 1979 and 2003, who studied in Egypt, or of Bashar al-Assad, President of Syria since 2000,
who was trained in ophthalmology in the United Kingdom.
Beyond anecdotal evidence, the literature does not provide a systematic quantitative analysis of the
impact of leaders’ migration history on the quality of the institutions they lead. This paper aims at filling
this gap. Thanks to the data at hand, we assess the effect of different types of migration experiences of the
leaders on democracy in their country. While migration per se is not found to affect the quality of political
institutions, it appears that leaders who studied abroad are associated with higher levels of democracy. We
identify different theoretical mechanisms that could explain this positive correlation and implement specific
empirical tests to disentangle them.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: next section briefly summarizes the related literature, both
regarding the impact of leaders and regarding the effects of migration on politics in the sending country.
Section 3 presents the data that were collected for this study. Benchmark results and the different theoretical
mechanisms potentially at play are presented in Section 4. We display empirical tests to investigate these
different channels in Sections 5, 6 and 7. Robustness checks are implemented in Section 8 and Section 9
finally concludes.
2 Literature review
2.1 Do decision-makers matter?
The impact of individual decision-makers on aggregate outcomes is an important question in economics.
The literature has already tackled this issue, as well as the extent and personal determinants of individuals’
influence, notably in the frames of firms and of central banks. Focusing on firm heads, Bertrand and
Schoar (2003) build an original data set that allows them to track individual managers during their whole
career across different firms. Thanks to these data, they are able to estimate the impact of manager fixed
effects on firm-level outcomes, controlling for year fixed effects as well as firm fixed effects and firm-level
time-varying characteristics. They emphasize an important impact of individual managers on corporate
practises and on firm performances. They also show that age and educational background partly explain the
observed differences in the manager fixed effects. A few papers have also investigated the impact of central
bankers’ characteristics. In particular, Adolph (2004) shows that central bankers’ career backgrounds affect
different outcomes such as inflation or interest rates, as well as declared preferences. In a similar perspective,
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Go¨hlmann and Vaubel (2007) find, in a panel setting, that central bankers have different levels of aversion
to inflation depending on their educational and occupational background.
As well as the characteristics of decision-makers may affect aggregate outcomes at the firm and central
bank levels, the characteristics of political leaders may shape aggregate outcomes at the country level.
This hypothesis is the basis of our paper, and has already been tackled by the economic literature. In
a seminal paper, Jones and Olken (2005) examine the change in national leaders as an explanation of
growth shifts. They rely on a data set gathering 130 countries over the 1945-2004 period, which represents
1,108 different national leaders for 1,294 distinct leadership periods. Investigating the impact of individual
leaders on growth is challenging since it is reasonably arguable that switches in leadership are not random.
Growth may in particular be an important determinant of the probability of leader change: for example, in
democratic settings, incumbents have been shown to be more likely to be reelected during economic booms
(Fair (1978)). Jones and Olken (2005) rely on an original strategy to assess the causal effect of leadership
changes on growth: they identify leaders who died unexpectedly during their tenure, either because of a
natural cause or in an accident, and thus exogenously left power. These cases of transitions provide natural
experiments to study the impact of leadership changes on economic outcomes: in such cases, the timing
of variation in the leadership is argued to be unrelated to underlying economic conditions. Thanks to this
identification strategy, they find robust evidence that leaders matter for growth, especially in autocratic
settings. They push the analysis further by investigating which policies are affected by individual leaders.
Their results provide strong evidence that leaders have an impact on monetary policy, while fiscal, trade
and security policies do not appear to be clearly affected. Putting forward a causative influence of political
leaders on economic outcomes, in particular in non-democratic settings, this paper paved the way for further
investigation on the role of leaders.
Logically following Jones and Olken (2005) results, as well as the literature documenting the impact of
firm managers and central bankers, the question of the individual characteristics that affect the quality of
leadership emerges. Besley, Montalvo, and Reynal-Querol (2011) go one step further in this direction by
investigating the impact of leaders’ education. They expand the data set used by Jones and Olken (2005)
to 1848, and collect information on education for a core sample of 1,654 leaders in 197 countries. They
rely on the same identification strategy as Jones and Olken (2005), and allow leaders’ effects to have an
heterogenous impact on growth depending on educational attainment. They put forward a significant impact
of leaders’ education on growth: the more educated the leader who leaves power unexpectedly, the larger
the adverse impact on economic growth. On the other hand, in a companion paper, Besley and Reynal-
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Querol (2011) question the process of choice of the leader by investigating the differences in educational
attainment between leaders who are selected in democracies and leaders who are selected in autocracies.
They emphasize an interesting result: democracies are shown to be more likely to select a highly educated
leader. Taken together, these two papers suggest that, on the one hand, democracies select leaders differently
regarding their educational background, and on the other hand, the educational background of the leaders
affects their influence on growth. Education of the leaders is also put under study, together with professional
background, by Dreher et al. (2009). This paper employs a panel data set over the 1970-2002 period,
which gathers information on more than 500 political leaders from 73 countries, to investigate the impact
of leaders’ education and occupation on the implementation of market-liberalizing reforms. They find that
former entrepreneurs and scientists tend to enhance reforms (measured by the Economic Freedom index
from Gwartney, Lawson, and Norton (2008)), while former unionists have the opposite effect. The effect of
profession is also shown to depend on the time spent in office: economists seem to be more reform-oriented
only after a certain time in power. To our knowledge, these papers are the only existing quantitative studies
on the individual characteristics that affect leaders’ influence on country-level outcomes, either growth or
liberalization reforms. Closely related to this literature, Franck and Rainer (2012) investigate the impact of
leaders’ ethnicity on infant mortality and education. Relying on individual data on a panel of 18 African
countries, they show that being the coethnic of the political leader is strongly positively correlated with
literacy and negatively with infant mortality. They thus provide evidence of ethnic favoritism through the
individual identity of the leader.
Focusing on local leaders, Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) investigate the impact of women’s leadership
on policy decisions. They rely on a randomized policy experiment which consists in the reservation of one
third of the Indian Village Council head positions for women. They investigate how this random treatment
affects the provision of different local public goods. They find that political reservation for women in Indian
local village councils induces a better access to public goods which are closely linked to women’s concerns,
like drinking water. Local leaders’ gender thus appears to affect their political choices in this setting. In a
recent work, Persson and Zhuravskaya (2011) study the impact of the personal characteristics of provincial
leaders on the provision of local public goods and on rent extraction in China. They build a panel data set
for 30 provinces of China over the 1986-2005 period, gathering information on the backgrounds and careers
of provincial party secretaries. In particular, they collect information on the different places where provincial
leaders worked before reaching this position, which allows them to identify party secretaries who have close
ties to the local elites (the so-called local party secretaries). They show that these local party secretaries
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behave differently in terms of policy choices: namely, they reallocate public expenditure in education and
health rather than in investment, provide more local public goods, and tend to extract less rent.
We build on this recent and promising literature on the personal characteristics of decision-makers.
Thanks to the collection of original data, we investigate the impact of leaders’ migration experience on the
quality of leadership in the developing world over the 1960-2004 period. A second strand of the literature,
which assesses the impact of migration on politics in the origin country, justifies asking this question.
2.2 The impact of migration on the origin country
The economic literature on migration and politics in the sending country underlines important interactions
between them. Two main approaches developed, respectively on the macro and micro nexus between the
different dimensions of migration and political outcomes. On the macro side first, and closely related to the
problematic of this paper, Spilimbergo (2009) questions the impact of foreign education on democracy in
the home country. Using a panel data set on foreign students starting in the 1950s, he finds that individuals
educated abroad have a fostering effect on democracy in their home country, if this education is acquired in
democratic countries. The author proposes five potential mechanisms through which education in a more
democratic country can positively affect democracy in the origin country.
“First, foreign-educated “technocrats” [...] can impose their own preferences in favor of democratic
regimes. Second, foreign-educated leaders seem to be extremely motivated to keep up with the more developed
countries where they studied [...]. Third, foreign-educated individuals make it more difficult for dictatorial
regimes to maintain repression, because they foster the dissemination of new ideas at home. Fourth, foreign-
educated individuals can make repressive activities more costly for a dictatorial regime, since they have easier
access to external media. [...] Fifth, education abroad may inculcate a sense of common identity with the
international democratic community.”
In this paper, we specifically investigate the second suggested channel, by focusing on leaders who lived
(and, in certain cases, studied) abroad before reaching power. Still in this macro perspective, Docquier
et al. (2011) document the effect of emigration on the home countries’ institutions. In a panel setting, they
investigate the impact of emigration rates, both total and skilled, on different measures of the quality of
institutions in the home country (namely, the Political Rights and Civil Liberties indicators from Freedom
House data set, the Polity score from Polity IV data set, and the Economic Freedom of the World index).
Their empirical results show a positive effect of total emigration rate on the quality of political institutions
in the sending country. The impact of skilled emigration is found to be ambiguous. They complement
6
this econometric analysis by simulations thanks to which they put forward a generally positive impact of
skilled emigration in the long run, once the impact of migration prospect on human capital formation in
the sending country is taken into account. In the same vein, Lodigiani and Salomone (2012) find that
international migration to countries with higher female political empowerment significantly increases the
share of women in the origin country’s parliament. Thus, on the macro side, the recent literature suggests a
positive impact of emigration on the quality of political institutions, through total and skilled migration as
well as through migration for studies. Nevertheless, the specific “leader” channel has never been investigated
yet.
Recent micro evidence on migration and political behaviors is consistent with these macro results. Batista
and Vicente (2011) rebuild the conditions of a referendum about political accountability and governance in
Cape Verde. While conducting a household survey focusing on perceived corruption in the public sector,
they offer respondents the possibility to anonymously send back a postcard asking for the disclosure of the
survey’s results by the media. They show that the proportion of international migrants (current and past)
in the locality of the respondents is positively associated with their probability to send back this postcard.
Thus emigration in general, and the presence of returnees in particular, are found to positively affect people’s
demand for political accountability. Moreover, the characteristics of the destination country seem to matter:
the impact of migration on the demand for political accountability is higher when the destination country has
better levels of governance. In a similar perspective, Pfutze (2012) investigates the impact of migration on
the probability that a party in opposition to the former state party in Mexico wins a municipal election. He
finds a positive impact of migration intensity on the electoral success of opposition parties. Omar Mahmoud
et al. (2012) study the impact of migration on the support for the Communist party in the parliamentary
elections in Moldova. They show that this support is lower in localities with more migration toward Western
countries. They complement their locality-level analysis with an individual-level exit poll, which reveals
that the probability that a non-migrant votes for the Communist party is negatively correlated with the
prevalence of westward migration in his locality. Finally, Chauvet and Mercier (2013) study the impact
of return migration on electoral behaviors in Mali and show that localities with a higher share of return
migrants coming back from non-African countries exhibit higher participation rates to the local elections, as
well as a more important level of electoral competitiveness. They also put forward a diffusion effect from
returnees to non-migrants, who adopt different electoral norms when they live in more return migration
intensive localities.
Both at the macro and at the micro level, these studies emphasize an important impact of migration
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intensity on politics in the home country, through more democratic institutions on the one hand, and through
different individual behaviors and preferences on the other hand. This second strand of the literature thus
supports the hypothesis that is under test in this paper, and encourages to ask whether leaders’ migration
experience affects the quality of their leadership.
3 A new database on the characteristics of the leaders
3.1 Data collection
We collected original data on the characteristics of a sample of leaders. We relied on the Archigos data
base of political leaders from Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza (2009), which identifies the primary ruler
in each country and year over the 1875-2004 period. Starting from this data set, we selected the sample
that is here under study, namely all the leaders at the head of a developing country between 1960 and 2004.
For each of these leaders, we then collected information on his personal and familial background, education,
profession, military experience, and finally, migration experience. In particular, we looked for the duration,
destination and objective of each migration period. Four objectives are distinguished: migration for studies,
migration for diplomatic reasons, migration for military reasons other than war (such as military training),
and exile. To gather these data, we relied on a range of web sources: the online Encylopedia Universalis,
the biographies of political leaders published by the Barcelona Centre for International Affairs (CIDOB -
Centro de Estudios y Documentacio´n Internacionales de Barcelona), Wikipedia, the websites of the national
Parliaments and political parties, etc. Our final data base provides information on 932 leaders who headed
136 developing countries during 1,042 leadership periods between 1960 and 2004. For the empirical analysis
that follows, we restrain this sample to leaders who stayed at least one year in power (see Section 3.3.1).
This restriction make us end up with 679 leaders who headed 134 developing countries during 742 distinct
leadership periods. Information on migration history is available for 610 of these leaders.
3.2 Who are the leaders?
Table 1 presents the main average characteristics of the leaders. Most of the 932 leaders in the developing
world over the 1960-2004 period are men (97%). In average, they reach power aged 51, and their tenure lasts
five years and a half. Half of the leaders are highly educated. Following Besley and Reynal-Querol (2011),
we define high education as having at least a master’s degree (or equivalent). In their data set, less than
30% of the leaders are classified as educated. The difference with the proportion we observe in our sample
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is in line with the global spreading of education observed over the last century: while we concentrate on
post-1960 leaders, their data start in 1848. Our database also contains information on leaders’ profession.
Ten categories are documented: army, law, economics, health, administration, academics, business, priests,
scientists and workers. Military professionals are the most represented category (28% of the leaders), followed
by lawyers (19%). Academics gather 14% of the leaders and scientists and professionals of administration
9.5% each. Then, around 8% of the leaders are economists. The four last categories are less represented:
health professionals represent 5% of the leaders, businessmen 4%, workers 3%, and priests 1%.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Average Standard Observations
Deviation
Woman 0.03 0.16 932
Age at arrival 51 11 926a
Tenure Duration (days) 2012 2687 932
High Education 0.51 0.50 775
Military 0.28 0.45 792
Law 0.19 0.39 792
Eco 0.08 0.27 792
Health 0.05 0.22 792
Admin 0.09 0.28 792
Academics 0.14 0.34 792
Worker 0.03 0.18 792
Religious 0.01 0.12 792
Scientist 0.09 0.28 792
Business 0.04 0.21 792
Migration 0.68 0.47 786
Mig - Diplomacy 0.13 0.33 786
Mig - Study 0.41 0.49 786
Mig - Exile 0.14 0.34 786
Mig - Military 0.18 0.38 786
Migration Duration (years) 7 8 373
aThe date of birth of six leaders of the sample are not available.
Information on migration experience is available for 786 of the 932 leaders.1 Focusing on them, it clearly
appears that migration has been a usual phenomenon within leaders in the developing world over the 1960-
2004 period. Indeed, 68% of them had a migration experience before reaching power. Migration is very
common within African (81%), Latin American (72%) and Asian (64%) leaders. It is less the case regarding
European leaders: 41% of them did live abroad before reaching power. We also have information on the
type of migration. 13% of the leaders migrated for diplomatic reasons and 41% of them for studying. 14%
of the leaders experienced an exile abroad. Finally, 18% of them lived abroad for military reasons. Taken
1This attrition may bias our results. We investigate this question in the next subsection.
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together, those migration experiences lasted in average seven years. Finally, we can identify the destinations
of those migration experiences. The first destination is Europe, where 25% of the leaders migrated. 11%
of them have lived in North America before reaching power, and 7% in Africa. Asia and South America
have been the destination of 6% and 5% of the leaders respectively. Less than 1% migrated to Oceania. Not
surprisingly, the distribution of migration experiences across destinations varies according to the country of
origin of the leaders. Notably, we observe important flows of “nearby migration”: 25% of the African leaders
migrated in Africa, which is the case of only 2% of the Asian leaders and less than 1% of the European and
South American leaders. Symmetrically, 17% of the South American leaders migrated within their continent,
while less than 1% of the African, European and Asian leaders went to Latin America. Migration toward
North America is also much more common within South American leaders (23% of them experienced it) than
within leaders from the rest of the world (respectively 9%, 5% and 2% of the Asian, African and European
leaders lived in North America). Finally, migration toward Europe is less discriminant: it concerned 37% of
the African leaders, 24% of the Asian leaders, 23% of the European leaders and 19% of the Latin American
leaders.
3.3 Sample
Compared to the entire sample of 932 leaders, we perform our econometric estimations on a sub-sample that
is restricted regarding two dimensions: first, we focus on the 679 “long-term” leaders, namely those who
stayed in power at least one year, and second we do not have information on migration experience for 69
of those 679 leaders. The final usable sample is thus composed of 610 leaders, representing 668 leadership
periods.
3.3.1 Short-term vs. long-term leaders
We restrict the sample to leaders who stayed at least one year in power for two reasons. First, from a
practical point of view, this allows us to match our leader-level data to country-level data that are typically
observed on a yearly basis. Second, from a theoretical point of view, leaders who spent a very short time
span in power probably did not have enough time to implement the structural reforms that are necessary
to the improvement of institutional quality. Excluding them from the sample thus diminishes the sources of
noise in our estimations.
However, those leaders may be different to those who spent less than one year in power. Annex A presents
the tests for the significance in the differences of leaders’ characteristics between the group of short-tenure
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leaders (excluded from the empirical analysis) and the group of leaders who stayed at least one year in
power. There is no significant differences between leaders who stayed more or less than one year in power
regarding gender and regarding most of the professional backgrounds considered. Leaders who stay more
than one year in power are found to reach power slightly younger (aged 51 in average) and, by construction,
to stay longer (a bit more than seven years in average). Leaders who stay more than one year in power are in
average less often highly educated. Importantly given the research question at stake here, they do not have
a significantly different probability to have migrated before reaching power, neither a significantly different
average migration duration. However, compared to those who stayed less than one year in power, they more
often experienced an exile, and less often migrated for diplomatic reasons.
3.3.2 Attrition issue
Information on leaders’ migration experience is available for 610 of the 679 leaders who stayed more than
one year in power. We thus face an attrition issue. This attrition is less pronounced for the restricted sample
of long-term leaders (attrition of 69 leaders, i.e. 11% of the sample) than for the whole sample (attrition of
146 leaders over 932, i.e. 16% of the sample). This is due to the fact that information on the characteristics
of short-term leaders are less easily findable. Still, attrition remains a concern.
Table 2: Attrition issue
Difference (t statistics) Observations
Leader-level variables
Woman -0.0246 (1.32) 679
Year of arrival -1.510 (0.77) 679
Tenure Duration -1759.5∗∗∗ (4.93) 679
Age at arrival -0.572 (0.42) 678
Country-level variables
Africa -0.116∗∗ (2.05) 679
Asia 0.00297 (-0.05) 679
South America 0.0541 (-0.92) 679
Europe 0.0510 (-1.20) 679
Polity score average -1.556∗ (-1.80) 627
Polity gap -1.014∗∗ (-2.01) 627
Polity score at arrival -1.610∗ (-1.82) 615
∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1.
To have a better view on the potential consequences of this attrition, Table 2 presents the test of the
significance in the differences between leaders who stayed more than one year in power for whom we do have
and do not have information on migration experience, regarding leader-level and country-level variables. As
expected, leaders for whom we do not find information on migration stayed in average less time in power.
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They are also relatively less located in Africa. Three political outcomes are tested: the average Polity score2
during the leader’s tenure, the difference between the highest and lowest Polity scores recorded during the
tenure, and the level of the Polity score when the leader reached power. It appears that leaders for whom
we lack data on migration led countries with slightly lower levels of democracy, both measured in average
and the year of their arrival. They are also characterized by a significantly smaller evolution observed in
the Polity score during their tenure. This should be kept in mind when interpreting the empirical results.
Moreover, in Annex B, we implement a specific test to shed light on the potential impact of this attrition
bias on our benchmark results.
4 Benchmark results
To assess the impact of the leader’s migration experience on democracy, we estimate Equation 1:
PolityScorei,j,t = α+ δMigrationj + γXj + τt + ηi + εi,j,t (1)
The dependent variable is the average Polity Score in country i during the period in power of leader j, who
reached power at time t. Polity score, from the Polity IV dataset (Marshall and Jaggers (2002)), is an index
of democracy provided by the Integrated Network for Societal Conflict Research (INSCR) of the Center for
Systemic Peace. It assigns to each country an annual score in the autocracy-democracy spectrum, ranging
from -10 (autocracy) to 10 (full democracy). We are interested in the impact on this democracy score of
the migration experience of leader j, Migrationj . We introduce time dummies τt as well as country fixed
effects ηi. We are thus able to control for all the time-invariant unobservable characteristics of the countries,
and for all the country-invariant time trends. Moreover, we cluster standard errors at the country level to
account for the potential within-country correlation of error terms.
We include a vector Xj of leader-level controls composed of three variables: the duration of the tenure
of leader j (in days), a dummy equaling one if j is a women, and an indicator of his education level.
Following Besley, Montalvo, and Reynal-Querol (2011), we focus on a simple dichotomous variable to capture
high versus non-high education. This dummy equals one when leader j has at least a master’s degree (or
equivalent), and zero otherwise.
Column 1 of Table 3 presents the results of the estimation of Equation 1. As expected, the duration of
2Polity score, from the Polity IV dataset (Marshall and Jaggers (2002)), is an index of democracy provided by the Integrated
Network for Societal Conflict Research (INSCR) of the Center for Systemic Peace. It assigns to each country an annual score
in the autocracy-democracy spectrum, ranging from -10 (autocracy) to 10 (full democracy).
12
the tenure is strongly negatively correlated with the quality of political institutions. On the contrary, we
find positive coefficients of the Woman and High Education dummies. Turning to our variable of interest,
the Migration dummy does not appear to be significantly correlated to democracy.
In a second step, we distinguish four types of migration: migration for studying, exile, migration for
diplomacy, and for military reasons (other than war). Column 2 of Table 3 presents the estimation of
Equation 2:
PolityScorei,j,t = α+δ1MigStudyj+δ2MigExilej+δ3MigDiplj+δ4MigMilitj+γXj+τt+ηi+εi,j,t (2)
When we split the migration variable in function of these four categories, the quality of political institutions
appears to be positively and significantly associated with the leader having studied abroad. Exile of the
leader is also positively associated with the Polity score, while the coefficient for migration for diplomatic
motives is not significant. Finally, leaders who lived abroad for military reasons before reaching power are
strongly negatively correlated with democracy in their countries. With this split of the Migration variable,
the coefficients for the gender and education dummies decrease both in size and significance, high education
turns out to be non significant, and the coefficient for the duration of the tenure remains very stable.
If migration per se is not significantly correlated with political outcomes, migrating for studying thus
appears to be positively correlated with democracy, even controlling for high education, while migrating
in a military context has the opposite effect. Finally, the experience of exile abroad seems to be positively
correlated with democracy. Exile, migration for studies or for military activities of the leader could however be
correlated with other country-level characteristics which themselves affect the quality of political institutions.
Introducing country fixed effects allows us to rule out all such time-invariant country characteristics. Still,
time-varying characteristics may matter. In Column 3, we add country-level control variables to capture
these trends. We introduce the GDP per capita growth observed in country i during leader j’s tenure (using
data from the Penn World Tables), which may be correlated with democratization. We also control for total
and skilled emigration rates, in average during the leader’s tenure (using data from Defoort (2008)). Since the
probability of having a leader with a migration experience must be higher, all else equal, in countries that are
characterized by a higher migration intensity, and since migration intensity may also directly affect democracy
as suggested by Docquier et al. (2011), controlling for emigration rate is theoretically important. Moreover,
population from the World Development Indicators is introduced. Finally, we control for the number of
students abroad normalized by population, to account for the mechanism emphasized by Spilimbergo (2009).
13
As shown in Column 3 however, the inclusion of these five variables does not weaken the estimated coefficients
associated with the four migration variables, which size and significance become even larger.
Finally, migration of the leader could be correlated with other individual characteristics that may affect
the quality of political institutions. This could in particular be the case of leaders’ professions, which have
been shown by Dreher et al. (2009) to have an impact on leaders’ propensity to implement market-liberalizing
reforms, and which are indeed correlated with migration experiences as shown in Annex C. In Column 4
of Table 3, we introduce as additional control variables ten different dummy variables for the profession of
the leader. This is our preferred specification. Precisely, we introduce the following professional categories:
army, law, economics, health, administration, academics, business, religion, science, and workers. Indeed,
one could wonder if the exile or education (resp. military activity) abroad effects are driven by the occupa-
tional categories of the leaders. The results show that having studied abroad remains positively significant,
while the coefficient associated to exile turns out to be non significant, as well as the negative impact of
military activities abroad. We present the joint t-test of the ten profession variables at the bottom of the
column. It shows that the different professions have indeed significant different impacts on the Polity score.
In particular, the coefficient for being a professional military appears to be negative and significant. Accord-
ing to these last estimates, countries which leader has a foreign education background exhibit an average
Polity score more than 1 point higher during the leader’s tenure.
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Table 3: Benchmark estimations
Dependent: Polity score (1) (2) (3) (4)
Tenure duration -0.000443*** -0.000446*** -0.000252 -0.000192
(0.000125) (0.000119) (0.000209) (0.000225)
Woman 2.660*** 1.527** 0.897 1.042
(0.767) (0.664) (0.595) (0.877)
High Education 1.729*** 0.723 0.202 -0.229
(0.453) (0.455) (0.439) (0.567)
Migration -0.438
(0.446)
Mig - Study 0.771* 1.365*** 1.276**
(0.443) (0.489) (0.500)
Mig - Exile 0.965** 1.049** 0.0264
(0.432) (0.441) (0.518)
Mig - Diplomacy -0.840 -0.312 -0.472
(0.612) (0.759) (0.746)
Mig - Military -2.700*** -3.912*** 0.122
(0.693) (0.794) (1.258)
GDP pc growth (tenure) -0.0768 0.0579
(0.112) (0.132)
Emig 14.24 14.12
(15.03) (16.00)
Skilled Emig 4.809 3.838
(5.193) (5.421)
Population -8.39e-09 -8.15e-09
(7.24e-09) (8.11e-09)
Students abroad -2.599 -6.584
(7.453) (7.373)
Law 0.745
(0.687)
Eco 0.00816
(0.856)
Health -0.619
(1.402)
Military -4.560***
(1.318)
Business -0.0708
(0.913)
Admin 0.291
(0.903)
Academics -0.560
(0.632)
Worker -0.0535
(1.527)
Scientist 0.246
(0.936)
Religious 1.425
(1.638)
Constant 1.088 -1.024 3.199 2.535
(1.331) (1.369) (1.967) (2.247)
Observations 577 577 403 377
R-squared 0.510 0.554 0.614 0.643
Number of countries 125 125 110 106
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Joint t-test 0.003
(Profession dummies)
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the country level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Channels
Studies abroad are positively correlated with democracy during the tenure. This correlation can reveal
that future leaders who study abroad become more democratic, but it could also be driven by something
else. We identify four theoretical mechanisms potentially at play.
1. The “democracies’ preference” channel
First, the positive correlation between democracy and the leader having studied abroad may reveal
that democratic countries prefer leaders with a migration background. Indeed, as Besley and Reynal-
Querol (2011) emphasize that democracies select more educated leaders, one could also imagine that
democracies select leaders who studied abroad. This story is consistent with the observed positive
correlation between the level of democracy of the country during the leader’s tenure and the dummy
variable indicating whether he studied abroad. It predicts that this positive correlation should be
driven by democratic countries, which have a preference for return migrants. The following Section is
dedicated to the investigation of this channel.
2. Coming back when the tide is turning
Second, future leaders may come back from migration when their country starts democratizing. In
particular, if emigration is triggered by dissatisfaction with respect to the home country’s leadership,
return migration may follow the first improvements of the political situation at home. The instance
that epitomizes this channel is political exiles who flee their country during times of repression and
start coming back (potentially already with the purpose of reaching power) when the political situation
becomes friendlier. This story is also consistent with a positive correlation between the leader’s migra-
tion background and the level of democracy in his country during his tenure. We implement empirical
tests to identify whether this mechanism is leading our benchmark results in Section 6.
3. Selection issues
Migration is not random, and an important strand of the literature - both theoretical and empirical -
emphasizes the important mechanisms of selection at play in the processes of migration and of return
migration. The positive correlation that we observe between the migration of the leader and democracy
during his tenure could also be biased by selection issues. Since migrants are selected, individuals (and
among them future leaders) who migrate may have specific characteristics that make them more prone
to democracy, and that would also have made them more prone to democracy had they not migrated.
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Section 7 deals with this selection bias through an empirical exercise aiming at isolating the decision
to migrate and the propensity to be democrat.
4. Studies abroad make future leaders more prone to democratize?
Finally, the observed positive correlation may attest to a positive impact of foreign studies on the
likelihood that the leader democratizes his country. This interpretation is in line with the recent
developments of the literature on the impact of migration on politics at home presented in Section 2.2,
according to which the experience of migration triggers transfers of political norms. Two different
mechanisms, potentially simultaneously at play, may be at the root of this impact: the quality of
education and the “preference shock”. First, leaders who studied abroad may have benefited from
higher quality training and thus have developed higher skills. As shown by Besley, Montalvo, and
Reynal-Querol (2011), better educated leaders exhibit higher growth outcomes. In this perspective,
one could imagine that better educated leaders also exhibit higher levels of democracy. If foreign
studies are characterized by a higher quality than local education, their positive impact on leaders’
propensity to democratize could reflect the fact that leaders who studied abroad reach a higher level of
skills. Alternatively, while studying in a foreign country, future leaders may experience a “preference
shock” that makes them more prone to democratize. This mechanism is in particular in line with the
convergence hypothesis put forward by the literature on return migrants, which states that, while being
abroad, migrants adopt specific behavioural norms to which they stick once back in their origin country.
Following this story, the“preference shock”channel assumes that future leaders, while studying abroad,
develop a higher preference for democracy, which translates into better levels of governance once they
reached power.
5 Do democracies prefer return migrants?
The benchmark results put forward a positive correlation between studies abroad and democracy, even when
controlling for leader-level and country-level variables. This positive correlation may reflect the fact that
countries with more democratic institutions prefer and tend to select leaders who studied abroad (Channel
1, the “democracies’ preference” channel). In this case, the coefficient would not reveal a better quality of the
leadership, but different tastes in the selection of the leaders, depending on the prevailing level of democracy
of the country. This issue is particularly relevant given the results emphasized by Besley and Reynal-Querol
(2011) regarding the education of leaders. They show that democratic countries tend to select more educated
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leaders. Symmetrically, one could imagine that democracies have a higher propensity to choose leaders who
studied abroad.
To test this issue, we introduce in our preferred specification (Column 4 of Table 3) the interactions
between each type of migration and a dummy indicating if the country was initially an autocracy, Initially
Autocratic. This variable is measured the first year of the leader’s tenure. It equals one if the country had then
a Polity score inferior or equal to zero, and zero otherwise. We also directly introduce this dummy within the
vector of explanatory variables. In this specification, the coefficient associated with each migration variable
corresponds to tenures which started in a relatively democratic context, while the correlation between each
migration variable and democracy in initially autocratic countries is given by the coefficient associated with
the migration variable plus the coefficient of its interaction with Initially Autocratic.
Table 4 presents the results. Not surprisingly, the Initially Autocratic dummy is significantly negative
in all four specifications: countries in which the tenure started in an autocratic setting tend to have an
average Polity score 9 points lower during the tenure. In Column 1, the Migration dummy is found to
be non significant. However, its interaction with the Initially Autocratic dummy is significantly positive,
suggesting that leaders of an initially autocratic country who experienced migration before reaching power are
characterized by an average Polity score around 1 point higher during their tenure. In the three last columns,
we split the Migration dummy in the four categories of migration experience, and successively introduce the
different groups of control variables (leader-level controls - the duration of the tenure, gender and education
of the leader -, country-level controls - GDP per capita growth, emigration and skilled emigration rates - and
finally the ten profession dummies). In those three estimations, the coefficient for Mig - Study turns out to
be non significant, and its interaction with Initially Autocratic is positive and significant. This suggests that,
while the migration experience of the leader is not significantly associated with the quality of institutions
when the tenure started in a relatively democratic setting, leaders who studied abroad are characterized by an
average Polity score around 2 points higher when they reached power in an autocratic context. These results
are exactly the opposite to what the “democracies’ preference” channel suggests: the positive correlation
between studies abroad and democracy is not due to the fact that democracies select return migrants but,
on the contrary, it is driven by countries in which the tenure started with a negative Polity score, in other
words by relatively autocratic countries.
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Table 4: Do democracies prefer return migrants?
Dependent: Polity score (1) (2) (3) (4)
Initially Autocratic -9.194*** -9.289*** -9.509*** -9.444***
(0.753) (0.683) (0.854) (0.913)
Migration -0.470
(0.373)
Initially Autocratic x Migration 1.337*
(0.684)
Mig - Study -0.148 0.175 0.325
(0.339) (0.374) (0.429)
Initially Autocratic x Mig - Study 1.932*** 2.554*** 2.332***
(0.634) (0.747) (0.762)
Mig - Exile -0.245 -0.396 -0.697
(0.490) (0.515) (0.603)
Initially Autocratic x Mig - Exile 0.925 2.304** 2.510**
(0.847) (1.112) (1.261)
Mig - Diplomacy -0.755 -0.392 -0.546
(0.628) (0.708) (0.779)
Initially Autocratic x Mig - Diplomacy 0.959 0.406 0.618
(0.904) (1.134) (1.356)
Mig - Military -1.232** -1.351*** -0.546
(0.597) (0.475) (0.850)
Initially Autocratic x Mig - Military 1.109 0.764 0.899
(0.706) (0.852) (0.880)
Constant 6.314*** 6.376*** 0.197 7.205***
(0.975) (1.035) (1.521) (1.607)
Observations 577 577 403 377
R-squared 0.813 0.822 0.840 0.840
Number of countries 125 125 110 106
Leader level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country level controls No No Yes Yes
Profession dummies No No No Yes
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the country level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Leader level controls refer to: Tenure duration, Woman, High Education. Country level controls refer
to: GDP pc growth (tenure), Emig, Skilled Emig, Pop and Students abroad normalized by population.
In Columns 2 and 3, migration for military reasons appears to be negatively correlated to democracy,
both in initially autocratic and in initially democratic countries. As already observed in Table 3, this effect
turns out to be non significant as soon as we introduce the leaders’ profession dummies (Column 4). Exile
is not significantly correlated with democracy in initially democratic settings, but its interaction with the
Initially Autocratic dummy is significantly positive in Columns 3 and 4. This positive correlation between
the leader having been exiled before reaching power and the level of democracy suggests a different source
of endogeneity: the fact that future leaders of initially autocratic countries may come back from migration
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when the quality of institutions is starting to improve in their country, or come back in the specific objective
to take power (Channel 2, “Coming back when the tide is turning”). This mechanism could also affect the
Mig - Study variable. We will investigate it in the following section. Finally, migration for diplomatic reasons
is never significantly correlated with democracy in Table 4, whatever the specification and the initial level
of democracy.
6 Do future leaders come back when the tide is turning?
Table 4 shows that the positive correlation between studies abroad and democracy is not due to the fact
that democracies select return migrants as leaders. However, it enlightens another mechanism that could
drive the results, namely the fact that migrants, among them future leaders, may come back to their country
of origin when it starts democratizing (Channel 2). This is in particular what suggests the positive and
significant coefficient associated with the exile of the leader in initially autocratic settings in Columns 3 and
4 of Table 4. To capture this effect, we re-iterate the estimations of Table 4, adding as a supplementary
control variable the average level of the Polity score observed during the previous leader’s tenure. Results
are shown in Columns 1 to 4 of Table 5.
The level of democracy during the previous leader’s tenure is found to be positively associated with the
average democracy during the current leader’s tenure. Turning to the migration variables, the results of the
four specifications are very close to those observed in Table 4 regarding Mig - Study and its interaction with
Initially Autocratic. Indeed, studies abroad remain significantly and positively associated with democracy
for leaders who started their tenure in an autocratic setting, with a slightly smaller coefficient. On the
contrary, the interaction between Mig - Exile and the Initially Autocratic dummy is now non significant in
all specifications. This suggests that the significance of this coefficient observed in Table 4 was led by the
mechanism described by Channel 2: future leaders coming back when the political situation starts being
friendlier.
20
Table 5: Controlling for past democracy
Dependent: Polity score (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Lagged Polity IV 0.124*** 0.116*** 0.0892** 0.100** 0.133**
(0.0322) (0.0322) (0.0357) (0.0409) (0.0632)
Initially Autocratic -8.645*** -8.686*** -9.273*** -9.107*** -9.736***
(0.734) (0.666) (0.876) (0.948) (1.284)
Migration -0.248
(0.371)
Initially Autocratic x Migration 1.069
(0.685)
Mig - Study -0.234 -0.197 -0.151 -0.137
(0.342) (0.334) (0.367) (0.340)
Initially Autocratic x Mig - Study 1.898*** 2.365*** 1.993*** 2.413***
(0.710) (0.762) (0.759) (0.669)
Mig - Exile 0.206 0.154 -0.134 0.0373
(0.427) (0.479) (0.545) (0.415)
Initially Autocratic x Mig - Exile -0.150 0.697 0.705 0.853
(0.737) (0.928) (1.103) (1.206)
Mig - Diplomacy -0.490 -0.191 -0.431 -0.760
(0.472) (0.562) (0.654) (0.519)
Initially Autocratic x Mig - Diplomacy 0.331 -0.00709 0.547 1.209
(0.733) (1.010) (1.190) (1.514)
Mig - Military -0.781 -0.999* 0.217 0.0665
(0.598) (0.506) (0.866) (1.156)
Initially Autocratic x Mig - Military 0.949 0.751 0.812 0.0208
(0.687) (0.857) (0.856) (1.261)
Constant 5.578*** 5.866*** 3.133** 3.423**
(0.868) (0.924) (1.362) (1.703)
Observations 511 511 373 351 222
R-squared 0.858 0.862 0.871 0.875
Number of countries 115 115 105 102 73
Leader level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country level controls No No Yes Yes Yes
Profession dummies No No No Yes Yes
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes No
AR(1) Test 0.020
AR(2) Test 0.591
Sargan Test 0.077 / 0.998
Number of instruments 101
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the country level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Leader level controls refer to: Tenure duration, Woman, High Education. Country level controls refer to: GDP pc growth
(tenure), Emig, Skilled Emig, Pop and Students abroad normalized by population.
Introducing the previous level of democracy in Table 5 allows to be more confident regarding the fact that
the positive correlation between studies abroad and democracy is not driven by future leaders coming back
when the institutional quality improves in their home country. However, it generates a bias associated to the
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dynamic panel form of these estimations: the lagged value of the Polity score is mechanically correlated with
the error term, yielding non consistent estimates. To take into account this econometric issue, we reproduce
the specification shown in Column 4 using the Generalized Method-of-Moments Estimator proposed by
Arellano and Bond (1991). This methodology relies on the first-differentiation of the estimated equation
(which eliminates the country fixed effects), and instrumentation of the first-difference of the lagged Polity
score by all its available further lags. Results are shown in Column 5. When we implement this methodology,
the coefficients estimated for Mig - Study and Initially Autocratic x Mig - Study remain very stable, as
compared to the fixed effects estimations.3,4
The results observed when we control for the previous tenure’s average level of democracy suggest that
the coefficient for studies abroad is not driven by migrants, among them future leaders, coming back when
the tide starts turning. But it introduces an asymmetry in the measure of the past level of democracy
given that the average level of democracy during the previous leader’s tenure is calculated over varying time
spans, depending on the number of years the previous leader spent in power. Alternatively, to capture the
potential expectations of democratization by an emigrant soon-to-be leader, we replace the average Polity
score during the previous leader’s tenure by the average level of democracy during the five years preceding
the arrival in power (Column 1, Table 6). Moreover, it is arguable that instead of the average level of
democracy, it is the evolution of this level which drives emigrants’ expectations of democratization. To take
it into account, we control in Column 2 of Table 6 for the difference between the highest and lowest scores
of democracy experienced by the country during the last five years. Finally, Column 3 of Table 6 presents a
last alternative way to check that the impact of studies abroad is not driven by future leaders coming back
when democratization starts, excluding from the sample leaders who reached power less than three years
after their return from migration and thus potentially returned precisely in order to become the leader.
Consistently with the results presented in Table 5, the three tests proposed in Table 6 confirm that
the coefficient for Initially Autocratic x Mig - Study is not driven by future leaders coming back to their
country when democratization starts. The coefficient of interest indeed remains very stable, both in size and
significance, thus enhancing the confidence in the fact that the mechanism emphasized by Channel 2 is not
biasing our main result.
3The GMM specification yields roughly satisfying tests, however results have to be taken with caution given the relatively
small number of observations.
4The GMM estimates remain stable when we successively remove the different sets of control variables (results available
upon request).
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Table 6: Do future leaders come back from migration when the tide is turning?
Dependent: Polity score (1) (2) (3)
Initially Autocratic -9.045*** -9.211*** -9.922***
(0.957) (1.016) (0.958)
Mig - Study -0.135 -0.165 -0.00911
(0.376) (0.403) (0.402)
Initially Autocratic x Mig - Study 1.959** 2.036** 2.367***
(0.763) (0.790) (0.805)
Mig - Exile -0.118 -0.139 -0.807
(0.543) (0.542) (0.629)
Initially Autocratic x Mig - Exile 0.741 0.498 2.866*
(1.108) (1.094) (1.483)
Mig - Diplomacy -0.486 -0.338 -0.725
(0.669) (0.664) (0.798)
Initially Autocratic x Mig - Diplomacy 0.568 0.554 2.353*
(1.185) (1.231) (1.382)
Mig - Military 0.258 0.145 -0.842
(0.852) (0.840) (1.131)
Initially Autocratic x Mig - Military 0.832 0.858 1.211
(0.849) (0.883) (0.989)
Polity score average - 5 years 0.117***
(0.0415)
Polity score gap - 5 years 0.0146
(0.0368)
Constant -3.805** 3.550* 7.402***
(1.684) (1.920) (1.851)
Observations 351 351 348
R-squared 0.876 0.871 0.860
Number of countries 103 103 105
Leader level controls Yes Yes Yes
Country level controls Yes Yes Yes
Profession dummies Yes Yes Yes
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the country level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Leader level controls refer to: Tenure duration, Woman, High Education. Country level
controls refer to: GDP pc growth (tenure), Emig, Skilled Emig, Pop and Students abroad
normalized by population.
7 The selection into migration
The two previous sections provide evidence that the positive correlation between studies abroad and democ-
racy is not driven by the two first channels identified in Section 4: potential preference of democratic countries
for return migrants, and future leaders coming back in their country when they witness the first signs of
democratization.
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This section aims at dealing with the third major source of potential endogeneity in the “migration of
the leader - democracy” nexus, namely individual selection into migration. It is clear that migrants are
self-selected. In this perspective, they may have specific characteristics that both make them more likely to
choose to study abroad, and more likely to be democrat. It is hardly feasible to control directly for all these
characteristics, many of them being unobservable or difficult to measure (e.g. open-mindedness, taste for
democracy, etc.). Alternatively, we propose here a simple empirical exercise to mitigate the selection bias.
In Table 7, we re-iterate the benchmark estimates (Table 3) trying to isolate the choice of migration, which
may be correlated with the individual characteristics simultaneously affecting the propensity to migrate and
to be democrat, and the impact of the migration experience. To do so, we rely on two tools. First, for each
migration experience, we introduce a dummy indicating if the leader migrated before being 15 years old. In
these cases, the choice of migrating, in all likelihood, was not made by the future leader himself but rather
by his parents. Moreover, to capture the unobserved characteristics of the leader that may be inherited from
his family, we also control for a dummy variable that equals one if the profession of the leader’s father was
skilled.
As shown in Table 7, the coefficient associated with the dummy for the occupation of the leader’s father is
always positive, its statistical significance depending on the specification. This positive correlation suggests
that leaders whose father’s occupation is skilled are associated with a higher level of democracy in average.
The coefficient associated with studies abroad, considering only leaders who migrated aged 14 or earlier, is
very stable in size as compared to the benchmark estimates. It only looses significance (with a p-value of
0.198) in the most demanding specification presented in Column (4). Note that, due to the introduction of
new variables which are not available for all leaders, the number of observations is lowered in this Table.
The results observed when focusing on early migration experiences and controlling for the leader’s inher-
ited social capital (proxied by the occupation of his father) suggest that selection is indeed at play in the
“migration of the leader - democracy”nexus, but does not completely drives the observed positive correlation
between studies abroad and democratization.
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Table 7: Selection into migration
Dependent: Polity Score (1) (2) (3) (4)
Migration Early -1.017
(1.211)
Mig - Study Early 1.798* 2.082* 2.012†
(0.917) (1.169) (1.553)
Mig - Military Early -1.594 -4.889** -3.664*
(2.608) (2.048) (2.033)
Mig - Exile Early -3.117* -4.906*** -3.530*
(1.611) (1.393) (1.969)
Fatherprof skil 0.805* 0.529 1.003** 0.936
(0.466) (0.526) (0.472) (0.681)
Constant 6.660* 9.846*** 8.000* -1.049
(3.590) (3.164) (4.211) (4.604)
Observations 326 326 235 217
R-squared 0.605 0.679 0.711 0.751
Number of countries 108 108 91 85
Leader level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country level controls No No Yes Yes
Profession dummies No No No Yes
Migration variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the country level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Leader level controls refer to: Tenure duration, Woman, High Education. Coun-
try level controls refer to: GDP pc growth (tenure), Emig, Skilled Emig, Pop
and Students abroad normalized by population.
The variable “Mig - Diplomacy Early” is dropped here since no leader in our
sample migrated for diplomatic reasons before the age of 15.
† p-val = 0.198.
8 Robustness tests
The fact that the leader studied abroad is positively and significantly associated with democracy during his
tenure, and the three previous sections provided evidence that this correlation is not driven by the three first
mechanisms identified in Section 4. On the contrary, the results suggest that leaders who studied abroad
before reaching power have a democratizing effect in countries with an initial low level of quality of political
institutions (Channel 4). Unfortunately, the data at hand do not allow us to test whether this impact is due
to migration per se, or capturing a better quality of education abroad, or both. In this section, we provide
four extensions to investigate further the main result.
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8.1 Alternative outcomes
First, one could wonder if we are here measuring the effective level of democracy during a leader’s tenure
or rather capturing a larger trend of democratization in the country, independent from individual leaders.
Controlling for the past Polity score (Tables 5 and 6, Section 6) was a first way to address this concern. To
go further in the investigation of this question, we replicate the estimations on two alternative dependent
variables:
• The difference between the highest and lowest Polity scores recorded during the tenure (Polity gap).
• The level of the Polity score measured the last year of the leader’s tenure (Polity last).
In these estimations, we also control for the gap in the Polity score observed during the previous leader’s
tenure, Lagged Polity gap. Columns 1 to 4 of Table 8 display the results concerning the first alternative
outcome, Polity gap. Lagged Polity gap has a negative and significant coefficient: countries in which the
index of democracy has changed more during the previous leadership tend to see their level of democracy
change less during the following leadership. In other words, after a transition, the countries of our sample
tended to stabilize in average. Moreover, countries which started with an initial autocratic setting exhibit
a more important average change in their level of democracy. In Columns 5 to 8 of Table 8, the dependent
variable is the level of democracy measured the last year of the tenure, Polity last. In this case, Lagged
Polity gap also has a negative but non significant coefficient. Not surprisingly, countries which started with
an initial autocratic setting exhibit a lower level of democracy at the end of the leader’s tenure.
For both dependent variables, migration is not significant neither in initially democratic nor in initially
autocratic countries. We also observe that Mig - Study is positively correlated with both outcomes when the
tenure started in an autocratic environment, which is in line with our benchmark results. More precisely,
the point estimates suggest that leaders who studied abroad are associated with an average change in the
Polity score during their tenure between 2 and 3 points larger, and with a Polity score between 3 and 4 points
higher when they leave power. It also appears in Columns 3 and 4 that leaders who experienced an exile tend
to be associated with a larger (resp. lower) Polity gap when they reached power in a relatively democratic
(resp. autocratic) setting, while leaders who migrated for diplomatic reasons are negatively correlated with
democracy in initially democratic settings. These two types of migration experiences are not significantly
correlated with the final level of democracy, Polity last. Finally, military migration is significantly associated
with none of the two dependant variables.
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Table 8: Alternative outcomes
Polity delta Polity last
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Lagged Polity Gap -0.105** -0.0959** -0.105* -0.131** 0.0526 0.0626 0.0758 0.0850
(0.0409) (0.0408) (0.0546) (0.0585) (0.0567) (0.0588) (0.0498) (0.0591)
Initially Autocratic 1.003 0.574 0.794 0.0501 -7.238*** -7.619*** -6.814*** -6.678***
(0.852) (0.761) (1.273) (1.274) (1.329) (1.206) (1.701) (1.835)
Migration 0.0619 -0.656
(0.430) (0.606)
Initially Autocratic x Migration 0.377 1.818
(0.901) (1.149)
Mig - Study -0.155 -0.391 -0.526 -0.825 -0.901* -0.855
(0.475) (0.499) (0.461) (0.521) (0.532) (0.569)
Initially Autocratic x Mig - Study 1.898** 2.155* 1.968† 3.368*** 4.077*** 3.829***
(0.931) (1.240) (1.306) (1.127) (1.384) (1.385)
Mig - Exile 0.189 0.247 0.738 0.0638 0.838 0.635
(0.667) (0.877) (0.934) (0.807) (0.747) (0.771)
Initially Autocratic x Mig - Exile -0.0656 -0.646 0.393 -0.891 -1.075 -1.098
(1.037) (1.349) (1.457) (1.257) (1.447) (1.562)
Mig - Diplomacy 0.649 -0.145 -0.0621 -1.341 -0.910 -1.133
(0.942) (0.873) (0.822) (1.021) (1.041) (1.120)
Initially Autocratic x Mig - Diplomacy -0.303 2.135 2.416 1.826 0.665 1.612
(1.216) (1.658) (1.686) (1.436) (1.639) (1.957)
Mig - Military 0.355 -0.390 -1.546 -0.755 -0.882 -0.394
(0.880) (0.766) (1.491) (0.806) (0.755) (1.552)
Initially Autocratic x Mig - Military 0.142 1.603 2.124 1.536 1.600 2.008
(1.301) (1.420) (1.351) (1.062) (1.338) (1.349)
Constant 2.708** 3.101** 2.162 2.770 -0.438 0.389 0.795 -0.265
(1.351) (1.200) (2.126) (2.501) (1.913) (2.111) (2.694) (3.154)
Observations 511 511 373 351 511 511 373 351
R-squared 0.280 0.294 0.436 0.495 0.589 0.604 0.615 0.639
Number of countries 115 115 105 102 115 115 105 102
Leader level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country level controls No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Profession dummies No No No Yes No No No Yes
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the country level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Leader level controls refer to: Tenure duration, Woman, High Education. Country level controls refer to: GDP pc growth (tenure), Emig,
Skilled Emig, Pop and Students abroad normalized by population.
† p-val = 0.141.
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8.2 Falsification test
If the effect that is at play here is that studies abroad make leaders more likely to promote democracy in their
country, we should not observe any significant correlation between Mig - Study and the level of democracy of
the country measured the year of the leader’s arrival in power (Initial Polity score). Indeed, democratization
implies structural reforms that require enough time to translate into an increase of the Polity score. This
falsification exercise also provides an alternative test for the “democracies’ preferences” channel tackled in
Section 5. If a process of selection is at play in the positive coefficient observed for studies abroad, we would
expect a similar coefficient when using the initial level of democracy as dependant variable. Such a result
would suggest that democracies have a higher propensity to select leaders who studied abroad, symmetrically
to Besley and Reynal-Querol (2011) who find a higher propensity of democracies to select educated leaders.
This test is displayed in Table 9. Consistently with our interpretation of the benchmark results, the
coefficient associated with migration, as well as the coefficients associated with foreign studies, migration
for diplomatic reasons, and exile, are not significant. Leaders who migrated for their studies are found to
positively affect the level of democracy in their country during the period when they are in power, but the
causation is not working the other way round: democracies do not tend to select leaders with an education
experience abroad. On the contrary, there is a negative significant correlation between the leader’s military
background (either considering his migration experience or his profession) and the level of democracy in
the year of his arrival, suggesting that democratic countries have a lower preference for militaries. This
falsification test reinforces the confidence in the interpretation of the main finding, according to which
leaders who studied abroad are more prone to democratize their country (Channel 4).
8.3 Competing stories
The positive impact of the leader having studied abroad on democratization is not driven by democracies
having a higher preference for return migrants, nor by future leaders coming back when democratization
starts, nor by unobservable individual characteristics driving both the decision to study abroad and the taste
for democracy. We also provided evidence that this result still holds when we focus on the evolution of
democracy during the tenure (rather than on its average), as well as on the level reached at the end of the
tenure.
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Table 9: Falsification test
Dependent: Lagged Polity score (1) (2) (3) (4)
Migration -0.967
(0.716)
Mig - Study 0.348 -0.0734 -0.495
(0.587) (0.637) (0.722)
Mig - Exile 0.0420 0.138 -0.192
(0.613) (0.630) (0.742)
Mig - Diplomacy -0.419 1.099 1.077
(0.772) (0.780) (0.855)
Mig - Military -2.092*** -2.507*** -1.242
(0.716) (0.891) (1.386)
Constant 0.758 -1.262 -1.228 1.169
(1.209) (1.594) (2.578) (3.642)
Observations 517 517 378 355
R-squared 0.360 0.373 0.460 0.507
Number of countries 115 115 106 104
Leader level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country level controls No No Yes Yes
Profession dummies No No No Yes
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the country level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Leader level controls refer to: Tenure duration, Woman, High Education. Country level
controls refer to: GDP pc growth (tenure), Emig, Skilled Emig, Pop and Students abroad
normalized by population.
Two other competing stories can still be imagined when thinking about the link between leaders’ studies
abroad and democracy. The first one concerns nepotism. Indeed, in a country where nepotism is widespread,
it is plausible that individuals who are potential future leaders and have access to the political networks take
their decisions of migration while they already know that they have a high probability to reach power. This
is likely to bias our results.5 To check this, we introduce in Columns 1 to 4 of Table 10 a dummy equaling
one if the leader has a familial link with one of the previous leaders of the country. This variable proxies
for nepotism and dynastic political systems. In our sample, around 10% of the leaders had indeed a familial
relationship with a past leader, as such this is not a marginal phenomenon over the period and countries of
analysis. Family Link is never significantly associated with democracy in the estimations, while the results
regarding studies abroad remain very stable.
5Nevertheless, it is reasonable to believe that this bias would work against us, given that leaders who reach power in a
context of widespread nepotism generally do not exhibit high levels of democracy.
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Table 10: Competing Stories
Dependent: Polity Score (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Migration -0.443 -0.441
(0.445) (0.449)
Mig - Study 0.764* 1.370*** 1.273** 0.771* 1.365*** 1.277**
(0.440) (0.492) (0.501) (0.443) (0.490) (0.500)
Mig - Exile 0.952** 1.050** 0.0394 0.998** 1.021** -0.0165
(0.431) (0.445) (0.522) (0.429) (0.442) (0.505)
Mig - Diplomacy -0.801 -0.351 -0.523 -0.843 -0.309 -0.476
(0.618) (0.779) (0.759) (0.612) (0.759) (0.750)
Mig - Military -2.714*** -3.937*** 0.0860 -2.716*** -3.900*** 0.116
(0.690) (0.780) (1.227) (0.695) (0.803) (1.263)
Family Link 0.493 0.423 -0.307 -0.441
(0.473) (0.534) (0.661) (0.672)
Foreign Imposition 0.240 -0.779 0.681 1.117
(1.519) (1.561) (2.179) (2.146)
Constant 1.042 -1.087 -7.340*** 2.795 1.096 -1.053 3.222 2.613
(1.332) (1.369) (2.003) (2.356) (1.336) (1.372) (1.970) (2.269)
Observations 577 577 403 377 577 577 403 377
R-squared 0.511 0.554 0.614 0.644 0.510 0.554 0.614 0.644
Number of countries 125 125 110 106 125 125 110 106
Leader level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Profession dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the country level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Leader level controls refer to: Tenure duration, Woman, High Education. Country level controls refer to: GDP pc growth (tenure),
Emig, Skilled Emig, Pop and Students abroad normalized by population.
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Second, one could think about the geopolitical relationships between countries as an important potential
omitted variable. Indeed, some leaders in the developing world have been imposed by external countries in
the last decades (around 1.6% of the leaders observed in the sample have reached power in such conditions).
In those specific cases, it is highly probable that among the potential leaders to be chosen, the foreign
country will prefer the candidate who came for studying. Again, this could bias the estimated link between
studies abroad and democracy. To control for this, we introduce in Column 5 to 8 of Table 10 a dummy
variable equaling one if the leader has been imposed by a foreign country. This variable comes from the
Archigos dataset. Here again, our main results regarding studies abroad are unchanged, while the coefficient
associated with Foreign Imposition is not significant.
8.4 Year-level panel
All the results presented above emanate from a panel data set built at the leader level: each line in the
database corresponds to one leader in one country. One could suspect that this design of the data leads to
a bias in the estimated coefficients, given that leaders who stayed in power for a longer period are given the
same weight as leaders who stayed shortly, by construction. To ensure that our results are not driven by
this, we re-build our data set making each line corresponding to one year. In this case, leaders are observed
as many times as the number of years they spent in power. Annex D reiterates the benchmark estimations
of Table 3 on this alternative database. It confirms our previous results: leaders who studied abroad appear
to be positively correlated with the level of democracy, measured in this case on a yearly basis.
9 Conclusion
This paper presents original data on the individual characteristics of leaders in developing countries over the
1960-2004 period, and in particular on their migration history. Thanks to these new data we put forward
a positive impact of the fact that the leader studied abroad on the quality of political institutions in the
country he’s at the head of. This effect is independent from the level of education reached.
We show that the effect of the leader having studied abroad on political institutions is driven by countries
which start from a low level of democracy. This is inconsistent with the idea that the positive correlation
between education abroad and democracy could be due to a higher propensity of democratic countries to
choose return migrants as leaders. We also check that our main result is not explained by the fact that future
leaders come back to their country of origin when it starts democratizing. Moreover, we provide evidence
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that self-selection into migration is not driving the benchmark result either.
The main result of this paper is confirmed by various robustness checks. This finding complements the
literature on the impact of political leaders’ individual characteristics, focused on education and occupation.
It is also in line with the literature regarding the impact of migration on politics in the origin country, which
suggests important diffusion effects regarding political preferences triggered by migration. Our results thus
propose a new channel - the political elites - through which these diffusion effects may occur, and through
which migration may be a tool of soft power in the perspective of democratization in developing countries.
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10 Appendices
Annex A: Differences between leaders who stayed more or less than one year in power
Table A
Difference (t statistics) Observations
Woman -0.0123 (1.06) 932
Age at arrival -2.224*** (2.74) 926a
Tenure Duration 2590.7*** (-14.63) 932
High Education - 0.0728* (1.73) 775
Military -0.0821** (2.24) 792
Law -0.00819 (0.25) 792
Eco -0.00450 (0.20) 792
Health -0.00700 (0.40) 792
Admin 0.0106 (-0.46) 792
Academics 0.0302 (-1.08) 792
Worker 0.0325** (-2.20) 792
Religious -0.00129 (0.14) 792
Scientist 0.00893 (-0.39) 792
Business 0.0211 (-1.24) 792
Migration 0.0437 (-1.11) 786
Mig - Diplomacy - 0.0544 * (1.93) 786
Mig - Study 0.0359 (-0.86) 786
Mig - Exile 0.0484 * (-1.67) 786
Mig - Military -0.00582 (0.18) 786
Migration Duration 0.747 (-0.65) 373
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
aThe date of birth of six leaders of the sample are not available.
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Annex B: Attrition issue
Among the sample of 679 leaders who stayed more than one year in power, we do not have information
on migration for 69 of them. In the following table, we re-iterate the benchmark estimations presented in
Table 3 by treating these 69 leaders as non-migrants. Indeed, it is more plausible that those missing values
equal 0, given that we rarely can directly read in a leader’s biography that “he never migrated”.
Table B
Dependent: Polity Score (1) (2) (3) (4)
Migration -0.442
(0.425)
Mig - Study 0.827** 1.325*** 1.184**
(0.411) (0.480) (0.506)
Mig - Exile 0.957** 1.153*** 0.251
(0.440) (0.429) (0.531)
Mig - Diplomacy -0.790 -0.195 -0.363
(0.618) (0.698) (0.696)
Mig - Military -2.788*** -3.873*** 0.00578
(0.681) (0.759) (1.143)
Constant 1.181 -1.055 -8.459*** 2.852
(1.334) (1.352) (1.985) (2.203)
Observations 604 604 417 390
R-squared 0.493 0.539 0.606 0.635
Number of countries 125 125 110 106
Leader level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country level controls No No Yes Yes
Profession dummies No No No Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the country level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Leader level controls refer to: Tenure duration, Woman, High Education. Coun-
try level controls refer to: GDP pc growth (tenure), Emig, Skilled Emig, Pop
and Students abroad normalized by population.
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Annex C: Correlation table between migration experiences and professional background
Table C
Migration Mig - Study Mig - Exile Mig - Diplomacy Mig - Military
Mig - Study 0.608***
Mig - Exile 0.309*** 0.108***
Mig - Diplomacy 0.262*** -0.076* -0.042
Mig - Military 0.330*** -0.110*** -0.060 0.073*
Military 0.158*** -0.238*** -0.122*** 0.103*** 0.740***
Law -0.128*** -0.033 0.069* -0.024 -0.224***
Eco 0.006 0.120*** -0.070* -0.034 -0.127***
Health 0.083** 0.150*** -0.024 -0.033 -0.086**
Admin 0.001 0.033 -0.011 0.082** -0.132***
Academics -0.014 0.117*** -0.014 -0.068* -0.178***
Business -0.041 0.023 0.057 -0.061 -0.071*
Religious -0.001 0.003 0.101** -0.046 -0.060
Scientist 0.013 0.135*** 0.067* -0.037 -0.089**
Worker -0.155*** -0.131*** 0.052 -0.053 -0.102**
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Annex D: Year-level panel
We re-iterate here the benchmark estimations presented in Table 3 on an alternative database where each
line corresponds to a country-year pair (versus each line corresponding to a country-leader pair in the initial
data).
Table D
Dependent: Polity Score (1) (2) (3) (4)
Migration -0.223
(0.479)
Mig - Study 0.923** 1.347** 1.195**
(0.448) (0.560) (0.601)
Mig - Exile 0.590 1.274** 0.471
(0.527) (0.493) (0.590)
Mig - Diplomacy -0.503 -0.0982 -0.175
(0.664) (0.827) (0.713)
Mig - Military -2.608*** -3.853*** -0.821
(0.632) (0.678) (1.062)
Constant -0.423 -0.510 1.244 3.692***
(3.020) (2.398) (1.053) (1.241)
Observations 4,386 4,386 2,596 2,400
R-squared 0.431 0.471 0.567 0.585
Number of countries 125 125 115 111
Leader level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country level controls No No Yes Yes
Profession dummies No No No Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the country level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Leader level controls refer to: Tenure duration, Woman, High Education. Country
level controls refer to: Annual GDP pc growth, Emig, Skilled Emig, Pop and
Students abroad normalized by population.
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